Independent cyber criminals can be as capable as some state-sponsored actors and have conducted many large-scale extortion and data theft operations.103 In 2019, an insurance consortium surmised that cyber criminals could launch a ransomware attack many times more costly than NotPetya.104 Hacktivists and terrorist groups, traditionally less capable, may some day acquire powerful cyber tools sold on the black market or accidentally released by states.105 Insiders with privileged access to cloud servers and other valuable digital assets can inflict tremendous costs, as demonstrated in the 2019 CapitalOne hack.106
Conflict Global storm hack tool
Insurance will be a key tool for countries seeking to better address cyber risk. But the insurance industry does not have all the answers, nor does it have all the resources needed to implement a comprehensive risk management framework. Ideas should draw upon expertise in a wide range of areas, including cyber conflict, warfare, international affairs, technology, cybersecurity public policy, disaster management, catastrophic risk, and more. Experts in these fields should recognize the stakes they hold in the development of cyber insurance. Likewise, the insurance industry should do more to educate outside stakeholders about the possibilities and limitations of cyber insurance. This paper represents one small step toward bridging these gaps and an invitation for further dialogue across disciplines and communities of interest.
Gamaredon Group is known to use strikingly off-the-shelf tools in their hacking activities. At the beginning of 2017, the Gamaredon Group made a shift to custom-developed malware instead of common RATs, showing that the group has improved its technical capabilities.
On Sept. 10, Privacy International (PI), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the Civil Liberties & Transparency Clinic of the University at Buffalo School of Law (CLTC) filed a series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests seeking essential records about the use of such hacking tools by U.S. federal law enforcement agencies. The FOIA requests aim to uncover the basic rules governing the use of these techniques, information about how frequently they are used, and any internal investigations into potential misuse. Privacy International and its partners submitted the requests to seven federal law enforcement agencies as well as four Offices of Inspector General.
A number of reports show that U.S. law enforcement is investing heavily in hacking technology. The FBI has spent over $1 million obtaining software to hack locked iPhones, and has indicated that it will continue to invest in such technology. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has purchased $2 million in hacking technology from Israeli company Cellebrite, in addition to record purchases of hacking software from other technology companies. Similarly, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has spent almost $1 million on hacking technology from an Italian surveillance technology company, called Hacking Team, and has expressed interest in hacking tools produced by NSO Group.
As it stands, the public is largely in the dark about how the government perceives the rules that govern its use of these tools for law enforcement purposes. The Fourth Amendment generally requires warrants based upon a finding of probable cause before there is a search or seizure. But it is unclear whether and when law enforcement agencies regard hacking techniques as being subject to a warrant requirement, judicial authorization short of a warrant, or no prior authorization at all. Further, little is known about the internal rules that law enforcement agencies have adopted to regulate the deployment of hacking techniques.
One of the most common and longest enduring forms of DRM, SecuROM uses a variety of methods to verify the integrity of a game, as well as prevent disc copying of the protected material. The original disc-based DRM solution is simply called "SecuROM", or sometimes SecuROM Disc Authentication, while the online activation-based version meant for digital distribution is called SecuROM Product Activation. At the launch of a game and during play SecuROM (both versions) would also monitor the system, preventing the game from running if it detects applications or tools that can be used to enable piracy, disassembly, or hacking of the game.
The world continues to suffer from a wide variety of conflicts. In the geopolitical realm, pro-Ukraine or pro-Russian hackers launch attacks with political motives. We also see the rise of environmental hacktivists targeting mining and oil companies.
This trend of attacks on cloud services by criminals, hackers, and nation states is growing as cloud computing takes over worldwide as the default model for information technologies. Leaked data is bad enough, but disruption to the cloud, even an outage at a single provider, could quickly cost the global economy billions of dollars a day.
Reuters was not able to establish how many organizations were compromised by the suspected Chinese operation. The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing investigations, said the attackers used computer infrastructure and hacking tools previously deployed by state-backed Chinese cyberspies.
On one level, deterrence and information warfare are well matched. Both belong to the world of robust ideas with broad implications. Both are highly relevant to the post-Cold War era in which conflict has been transformed from bipolar global structures to multi-sided, local and regional contests in which the military element is a crucial part of, but not the driving force for, competition and conflict. On the other hand, the two topics can be seen as orders of magnitude apart. IW is a huge domain, ranging from media wars to electronic combat and from economic competition to strategic conflict waged against civilian populations. Deterrence, while it has proven robust (i.e., applies across a range of situations), actually is a narrow concept that works only under a set of quite restrictive assumptions. Not surprisingly, therefore, the workshop participants found the relationship between the two concepts to be spotty -- highly relevant on some topics, marginally so on others, and not at all relevant in many areas.
Moreover, while barely unveiling the true potential of highly leveraged information and superior battlefield awareness, Desert Storm has provided the world with a demonstration of the potential advantage of information dominance. Finally, the workshop concluded that research and development into tools and techniques that can impact potential adversaries' knowledge of the battlefield, control of their own forces, resources necessary to support armed conflict and deliver services to their populations, or leverage uncertainty about their own information, should go forward.
In an ongoing effort to understand the connections between water resources, water systems, and international security and conflict, the Pacific Institute has coordinated a project for over twenty years to track and categorize events related to water and conflict. We produce and maintain the Water and Conflict Chronology, which traces the history of water as a tool of war and conflict going back 5,000 years. It presents these data three ways: a timeline showing when conflicts over water occurred, an interactive map showing the location of these conflicts, and a detailed list that can be filtered by region, conflict type, and date.
The combination of advantages already seen in this conflict -- precision power from the air, real-time intelligence, special forces, the long reach of Naval task forces, and close coordination with local forces represents a dramatic advance in our ability to engage and defeat the enemy. These advantages will only become more vital in future campaigns. President Bush has often spoken of how America can keep the peace by redefining war on our terms. That means that our armed services must have every tool to answer any threat that forms against us. It means that any enemy conspiring to harm America or our friends must face a swift, a certain and a devastating response. (Applause.)
Gain: The United States Marine Corps (USMC), with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Concept, is ideal for rapid response to humanitarian disasters, evacuation of nationals from conflict zones, robust peacekeeping, and military assistance to host governments facing an insurgency. Rapid reaction and a flexible mix of capabilities makes this an ideal tool, especially in non-permissive environments. A battalion of Marines is the wrong tool for counter terrorism missions, it is the best tool when coercive presence is required. 2ff7e9595c
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